报告内容简介：We consider a mixed duopoly service system in which a profit-maximizing private service provider (SP) competes against a welfare-maximizing public SP (or equivalently, a social planner). The two SPs’ service quality is differentiated and customers are heterogeneous on quality taste. We first consider the scenario where premium service is provided by the private SP and the regular one by the public SP. We show that welfare can be improved if the public SP is privatized and there exists an optimal level of privatization for the public SP
in terms of welfare maximization; under some conditions, full privatization is optimal. We then extend our analysis to the other scenario where the premium service is provided by the public SP and the regular one by the private SP, and obtain similar findings. By comparing the maximal welfare of the two scenarios, we find that the latter scenario prevails when the service rate or/and the service quality of the premium service is/are relatively high. Furthermore, under the prevailed scenario, partial privatization is adopted.
报告人简介：Pengfei Guo is current a full professor of the Department of Logistics and Maritime Studies, the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. He joined Hong Kong PolyU in 2007, after having obtained his Ph.D. degree in business administration from Duke University. He got a bachelor degree from Xi’an Jiaotong University and a master degree from Shanghai Jiaotong University. His main research interest is on the design and control of service systems with strategic customers and he is also interested in inventory and supply chain management. He has published 30 papers and 12 of them are published on UTD journals such as Management Science, Operations Research, M&SOM and POM. He is currently serving as a senior editor for the POM journal.
