讲座摘要：This lecture will examine the impact of Fee-for-Service and BundledPayment reimbursement schemeson the social welfare, the patient revisit rate, and the patient waiting timein a three-tiered public healthcare system comprising (a) a public funder whodecides on the reimbursement rate to maximize the social welfare, (b) a publichealthcare provider (HCP) who decides on the service rate (which affects therevisit rate and operating cost), and (c) a pool of (waiting time-sensitive)patients who decide whether or not to seek elective treatments. We focus ouranalysis on (1) a Fee-for-Service (FFS) scheme under which the HCP receives thepayment each time a patient visits (or revisits); and (2) a Bundled Payment(BP) scheme under which the HCP receives a lump sum payment for the entireepisode of care for each patient (regardless of the number of revisits). Byconsidering an M/M/1 queueing model with endogenous arrivals and revisits, weanalyze a three-stage Stackelberg game to determine the patients' initial visitrate, the HCP's service rate (which affects the revisit rate), and the funder'sreimbursement rate. The above analysis enables us to compare the equilibriumoutcomes (social welfare, revisit rate and waiting time) associated with theFFS and BP schemes. We find that when the patient pool is large, the BP schemedominates in terms of higher social welfare and lower revisit rate, but the FFSscheme dominates in terms of waiting time. However, when the patientpool is small, the BP scheme dominates the FFS scheme in all three performancemeasures.
主讲人简介：汪玉兰（Dr Yulan Wang）是香港理工大学海运及物流系副教授。她拥有美国杜克大学（Duke University）工商管理博士学位，上海交通大学硕士与学士。她的研究已发表于众多国际顶级期刊，如Management Science,Operations Research,Production and Operations Management,Naval Research Logistics,European Journal of Operational Research.Dr Yulan Wang的研究领域包括了supply chainoutsourcing, the application of game theory in system design and coordination,and the behavior issues in operations management.
报告语言：英语
